Twenty-five years after its creation, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation has become much bigger, more visible and more ambitious.
It now brings together countries representing roughly a quarter of the world’s population and close to a quarter of global economic output. At its anniversary summit in Bishkek, 21 heads of state and government gathered for the ceremonial family photograph, while members approved a declaration and dozens of agreements covering issues ranging from security to nuclear cooperation.
On paper, it looked like the emergence of a powerful alternative center of global influence.
Look more closely, however, and a very different picture appears.
China wants a stronger multipolar order with Beijing playing a central role. Russia wants political partners at a time when its international room for maneuver has narrowed. India wants strategic autonomy, stronger ties with Central Asia and freedom to disagree with both Moscow and Beijing when its own interests demand it.
Even inside the same summit hall, the three biggest powers were often looking in different directions.
Yet that may not mean the SCO is failing.
The more interesting possibility is that the organisation has survived for 25 years precisely because its members have never been required to speak with one voice.
A Powerful Bloc That Is Not Really a Bloc
The anniversary summit produced the usual symbols of unity.
Leaders signed the Bishkek Declaration, promised deeper cooperation and presented the SCO as an increasingly important voice in a changing international order.
But the organisation remains very different from a conventional alliance.
There is no equivalent of NATO’s collective-defense commitment. Members are not required to coordinate foreign policy. Nor does the SCO possess an especially powerful mechanism for resolving disputes between its own members.
That becomes obvious when looking at who belongs to it.
India and Pakistan remain bitter strategic rivals.
India and China have spent years managing serious tensions along their disputed border.
Russia and China cooperate closely but also compete for influence, particularly across Central Asia.
Iran has its own confrontation with Western powers, while the Central Asian states often attempt to balance relationships with China, Russia, Europe, Turkey and the United States.
An organisation containing so many competing interests was never likely to function like a unified geopolitical alliance.
Modi Used the Summit to Highlight Those Differences
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s speeches in Bishkek demonstrated how members can use the SCO not to hide disagreements, but to display them.
With Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif present, Modi said there could be no double standards in fighting terrorism and argued that terrorism must never become a strategic instrument.
He did not name Pakistan directly, but the political message was difficult to miss.
The Bishkek Declaration itself condemned terrorism and stressed the need to fight cross-border terrorism without double standards.
For India, the SCO therefore became a platform from which it could promote cooperation while simultaneously sending a warning to another SCO member.
That is hardly the behavior of states speaking with one geopolitical voice.
But it is characteristic of how the organisation works.
India Also Sent Russia a Message
Modi’s diplomacy in Bishkek also illustrated another contradiction.
India maintains deep economic and strategic ties with Russia. Moscow remains an important defense partner, and Russian energy has become increasingly significant for India.
Yet during his meeting with Vladimir Putin, Modi publicly urged movement toward ending the war in Ukraine.
He told Putin that prolonged war was pushing humanity backward and argued for dialogue and peace.
The exchange was friendly, but the political message was unmistakable.
India was not prepared to automatically adopt Moscow’s position simply because both countries sit inside the SCO.
Reuters reported that Putin welcomed India’s peace efforts while continuing to insist that any settlement must reflect Russia’s own conditions, which remain unacceptable to Ukraine.
This illustrates India’s wider foreign-policy strategy.
New Delhi wants access to Russian energy, deeper engagement with the United States and Europe, cooperation with China where possible and continued leadership among developing nations.
Joining an organisation does not mean surrendering that flexibility.
China Wants Something Different
China’s calculations are different again.
For Beijing, the SCO provides another platform for promoting a world order less dominated by Western institutions.
It also gives China deeper political access to Central Asia and strengthens its ability to present itself as a leader of the broader non-Western world.
But China’s behavior at the anniversary summit also suggested that Beijing does not necessarily view every SCO relationship as equally valuable.
President Xi Jinping’s most notable confirmed bilateral engagement at the summit was with Putin, while he subsequently traveled to Egypt ahead of further diplomacy linked to BRICS.
The symbolism matters.
China increasingly operates through several overlapping institutions, including the SCO, BRICS and its own bilateral relationships.
The SCO is useful, but it is only one piece of a much larger Chinese diplomatic architecture.
Russia Needs the SCO More Than It Once Did
For Vladimir Putin, the organisation serves another purpose.
His diplomatic options have narrowed significantly because of the Ukraine war and the International Criminal Court arrest warrant issued against him.
Forums such as the SCO and BRICS therefore offer valuable opportunities to meet leaders who continue to engage with Moscow.
At Bishkek, Putin held numerous bilateral meetings, including talks with leaders from India, China, Iran and several Central Asian countries.
The activity gave Russia an opportunity to demonstrate that it is not internationally isolated.
But the large number of meetings also revealed something else.
Russia increasingly needs platforms where friendly or non-Western governments are prepared to meet its leadership.
At the same time, even some of those partners are becoming more willing to express disagreement with Moscow.
India’s public call for an end to the Ukraine war is a clear example.
Central Asia Does Not Want to Choose Sides Either
The smaller SCO members should not be overlooked.
For Central Asian countries such as Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, the organisation provides access to two giant neighboring powers while also allowing them to pursue their own economic and diplomatic interests.
These countries have no obvious reason to replace dependence on Russia with dependence on China.
Instead, many are attempting to diversify.
They want Chinese investment, Russian trade links, European markets, Turkish engagement and relationships with other international partners.
The SCO suits this strategy because it does not demand exclusive loyalty.
That flexibility may be one of the institution’s greatest attractions.
Enlargement Has Increased Influence and Contradictions
The organisation’s expansion has strengthened its global visibility.
But every new member also introduces additional foreign-policy interests, regional disputes and political priorities.
Iran’s membership, for example, gives the SCO greater geopolitical reach into the Middle East.
At the 2026 summit, members criticized military attacks on Iran while avoiding direct references to the United States and Israel in parts of the declaration, demonstrating the careful diplomatic language required to maintain consensus among such a diverse group.
The organisation therefore faces an unusual paradox.
The larger it becomes, the more impressive it appears.
But the larger it becomes, the harder genuine political unity becomes.
Perhaps Unity Was Never the Point
This leads to a different way of judging the SCO.
If its success is measured by whether India, Russia and China develop a common foreign policy, then the organisation looks deeply flawed.
But if it is viewed as a diplomatic marketplace, its record appears more substantial.
Leaders meet.
Bilateral agreements are negotiated.
Security cooperation continues.
Central Asian countries gain direct access to major powers.
India can speak to China and Russia without joining their strategic camp.
Russia can demonstrate that it retains influential partners.
China can promote an alternative vision of international governance without demanding that every participant become a formal ally.
That is a much looser form of international organisation, but it is not necessarily an ineffective one.
Strategic Autonomy May Be the SCO’s Real Organising Principle
The SCO is frequently described as an anti-Western grouping.
There is some truth in that description, particularly in its rhetoric about multipolarity, sovereignty and resistance to Western political pressure.
But the reality is more complicated.
India, for example, is simultaneously a member of the SCO and the Quad, where it cooperates with the United States, Japan and Australia.
It maintains important relations with Washington while continuing to buy Russian oil and participate in institutions led or strongly influenced by China.
That would be extremely difficult inside a tightly disciplined alliance.
Inside the SCO, it is normal.
Rather than a coalition built around one shared ideology, the organisation increasingly resembles a collection of states determined to preserve room for maneuver in a fragmented global order.
The SCO’s Contradictions Could Become More Valuable
This may actually increase the organisation’s relevance as geopolitical competition intensifies.
Countries around the world are increasingly reluctant to choose permanently between Washington, Beijing, Moscow and other major centers of power.
Many prefer overlapping relationships.
They may cooperate with China on infrastructure, buy energy from Russia, maintain trade with Europe and seek security ties with the United States at the same time.
The SCO accommodates that behavior unusually well because ideological consistency has never been its strongest requirement.
What looks like institutional weakness can therefore function as diplomatic flexibility.
At 25, the SCO Is Not a United Front
The anniversary summit made one thing very clear.
China, India and Russia are not speaking with one voice.
Modi used the meeting to warn Pakistan about terrorism and publicly pressure Putin over Ukraine.
Xi promoted China’s wider geopolitical ambitions.
Putin used the gathering to reinforce relationships at a time when Russia is under significant international pressure.
All three participated in the same institution, signed the same broad declaration and then pursued distinctly national agendas. The Daily Star’s analysis rightly notes that the SCO has often served more effectively as a venue for bilateral diplomacy than as a mechanism for resolving disputes among members.
Yet perhaps expecting anything more misunderstands what the SCO has become.
Its future may not depend on turning China, Russia and India into strategic allies.
It may depend on continuing to provide a room large enough for rivals, partners and competing powers to sit at the same table without being required to agree on everything.
At 25, the SCO’s biggest contradiction is also potentially its greatest source of resilience.
It is influential because its members matter.
It survives because they are allowed to disagree.